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Abstract 
 The purpose of this two-part article is to examine the regulatory 
environment governing hearsay electronic evidence in South Africa with a 
view to suggesting law reform in the light of the most recent proposals put 
forward by the South African Law Reform Commission. 
Part one considered the definition of data messages in the context of 
hearsay electronic evidence and concluded that amendment is required 
(as suggested by the South African Law Reform Commission). Further, 
part one sought to answer two additional queries posed in Discussion 
Paper 131 Review of the Law of Evidence in relation to electronic hearsay, 
ultimately finding that a data message can constitute hearsay within the 
meaning of the applicable legislation; further, that South African law must 
distinguish between data messages produced substantially by a computer 
or mechanical process and those that rely substantially on the credibility 
of a person. 
Part two of this article will review the statutory exceptions to the hearsay 
rules applicable to electronic evidence, including the controversial section 
15(4) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
Further, part two will analyse the situation in selected foreign jurisdictions 
where hearsay electronic evidence has had more time to mature and 
develop (United Kingdom, Canada and United States) with a view to 
incorporating suggestions that South Africa can implement.  
Finally, this article will conclude by providing suggestions for law reform in 
the context of the recommendations put forward by the South African Law 
Reform Commission, and will suggest that that there must be law reform 
in at least the following areas: the definition of data messages; the 
definition of the term document in the statutes applicable to the hearsay 
exceptions; a distinction between types of electronic evidence insofar as 
computer-generated evidence with human intervention, and without 
human intervention is concerned; and more cohesion and alignment with 
the statutory hearsay exceptions. 
Keywords 
Electronic evidence; data messages; ECT Act; law of evidence; 
South African Law Reform Commission; technology and law. 
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1 Introduction 
Given the enormous increase in internet penetration in South Africa1 and 
our society's apparent increasing reliance on technology,2 it is reasonable 
to infer that the use of data messages3 as evidence in all forms of legal 
proceedings will continue to increase.  
Part one4 of this two-part article examined the regulatory framework 
governing hearsay electronic evidence in South Africa and sought to answer 
three critical questions posed by the South African Law Reform Commission 
(SALRC):5 should the definition of data messages be revised?6 Should a 
data message constitute hearsay?7 And, how should one distinguish 
between documentary evidence and real evidence in the context of data 
messages?8 
Part two will seek to complete this discussion by reviewing the statutory 
exceptions to the hearsay rules applicable to electronic evidence, including 
the controversial9 section 15(4) of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (the ECT Act). Further, part two of this article 
will analyse the situation in selected foreign jurisdictions where electronic 
evidence has had more time to mature and develop (the United Kingdom, 
Canada and the United States). Finally, this article will conclude by 
                                            
* Lee Swales. LLB (UKZN) LLM (Wits). Lecturer, School of Law, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal and Consultant Attorney Thomson Wilks Inc. E-mail: 
swalesl@ukzn.ac.za. A revised version of this paper was presented at a conference 
of the South African Association of Intellectual Property Law and Information 
Technology Law Teachers and Researchers, hosted by Stellenbosch University on 
21-22 June 2017. This paper forms part of an ongoing PhD study.  
1  Internet World Stats 2017 http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#za: roughly 
54% of South Africa's population had internet access as at June 2017. In 2008 the 
South African penetration rate was roughly 9%. 
2  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 437; Papadopoulos 
and Snail Cyberlaw@SA III 1; Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications 
Technology Law 1 
3  Swales 2018 PELJ 3-5 for a discussion on data messages. 
4  See Swales 2018 PELJ – https://doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2018/v21i0a2916  
5  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 where issue 3 considers whether the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (the ECT Act) definition of data 
message should be revised; issue 6 considers s 15 of the ECT Act and the hearsay 
rules in the context of electronic evidence; and issue 7 considers whether there 
should be a distinction between different types of electronic evidence. Also see 
SALRC Issue Paper 27 7-49. 
6  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 52-55; Swales 2018 PELJ 3-5. 
7  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 62-68; Swales 2018 PELJ 8-14. 
8  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 68-70; Swales 2018 PELJ 14-23. 
9  LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v La Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 12. 
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providing suggestions for law reform in the context of the recommendations 
put forward by the SALRC.10 
2 Hearsay electronic evidence 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act11 defines hearsay evidence as:  
evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends 
upon the credibility of any person other than the person giving such evidence. 
Although not specifically stated, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
applies to data messages.12 Simply, hearsay electronic evidence (in the 
form of a data message) is that evidence where the creator of the document 
(or other form of data message) is not at court to directly testify.  
As noted in part one of this article, if a data message is classified as real 
evidence, then it should not be subject to a hearsay analysis, and should be 
admissible if it is otherwise relevant.13 There is some debate as to whether 
real electronic evidence must also be authentic (and relevant) to be 
admissible, or whether the authenticity of the real electronic evidence is 
considered when determining the weight of the data message. There is 
authority for both propositions.14 
Traditionally, hearsay evidence was excluded on the basis that it may 
unduly influence a jury,15 the rationale being that the evidence is not direct, 
and cannot be directly tested. That is, one is not able to cross-examine a 
witness about what the witness saw, or knows, or heard, nor is one able to 
observe the body language and general demeanor of the person in 
question. 
Arguably, however, with a legal system that has long dispensed with a jury, 
a unitary court (with a trained legal expert as Judge) is unlikely to be unduly 
influenced by hearsay evidence. Although this is beyond the scope of this 
                                            
10  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 83-106. 
11  Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
12  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 31; LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 19; 
Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 432-435; Schwikkard and Van 
der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 441-446; Hofman 2006 SACJ 262; 
Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 474-475. 
13  Swales 2018 PELJ 14-23. 
14  Swales 2018 PELJ 17-19. 
15  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 287. 
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article, it may be necessary to re-consider hearsay and the rationale for its 
existence entirely.16 
3 Exceptions to the hearsay rule 
If a data message is relevant and authentic – on the basis that it is classified 
as documentary evidence, and not real evidence – the rules regulating 
hearsay may still mean the evidence is excluded17 if the person responsible 
for the document is not at court.18 Consequently, in the context of hearsay 
electronic evidence, there are a number of statutory exceptions where 
hearsay evidence will be admitted.19  
3.1 The Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act20 changed21 the law of evidence by 
introducing a statutory definition of hearsay and including several 
exceptions to the exclusionary hearsay rule. The three exceptions created 
by section 3(1) are as follows: 
 in terms of 3(1)(a) where the party against whom the hearsay 
evidence is to be adduced agrees to its admission; 
 in terms of 3(1)(b) where the person upon whose credibility the 
probative value of the hearsay evidence depends testifies; and 
 in terms of 3(1)(c) where a court is provided with a list of factors, and 
ultimately has a wide discretion to admit hearsay evidence if the court 
deems it to be in the interests of justice. 
Consequently, even if a court takes a conservative approach and classifies 
a data message as documentary hearsay evidence, then it will still have the 
discretion to admit the hearsay data message, if it is of the view that the 
interests of justice demand its admission into evidence. Therefore, where a 
court is in doubt as to the classification of a data message, it may classify it 
as documentary hearsay and still have the ability to receive it into evidence 
                                            
16  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 287. 
17 Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 770. 
18  Hearsay as defined by s 3(4) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
19 Hofman 2006 SACJ 265-268; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 
4th ed 305-323; Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 418-441. 
20  Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
21  Hofman 2006 SACJ 265. 
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via the broad discretion vested in a court via the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act.22 
3.2 The Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 
Of the three primary exceptions created by the Civil Proceedings Evidence 
Act23 (CPEA) in the context of data messages, one relates to bankers' 
books, one relates to business records, and there is a general exception 
where the author of a data message is not available.24 The promulgation of 
the CPEA took place when data messages were not fully contemplated or 
developed but, as noted by Hofman,25 there is no reason these exceptions 
should not apply to electronic evidence.  
Section 34(1)(a)(i) creates an exception for situations where the author of 
the data message had personal knowledge of the statements made therein 
but is not available to testify. Section 34(1)(a)(ii), the wording of which is 
certainly not a model of clarity, creates a further exception where a 
document was created by someone who was recording another (which 
recording is continuous and in the ordinary course of duty), and the person 
who was being recorded had personal knowledge of the statement.26 
The details pertaining to these exceptions, largely nullified27 by the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act (and are therefore less applicable than they once 
were), are discussed in ordinary textbooks dealing with the law of 
evidence.28 Even though controversial, the creation of the business records 
exception in section 15 of the ECT Act, discussed below, has further nullified 
the use of the older, more traditional hearsay exceptions.  
                                            
22  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 22; LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a La Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 18. 
23  Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 (CPEA). 
24  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 310-316.  
25  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 771. 
26  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 770-771. 
27  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 771. 
28  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 311-316; Schwikkard 
and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 290-301; Zeffertt and Paizes South 
African Law of Evidence 418-429; Bellengere et al Law of Evidence 295-305. 
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3.3 The Criminal Procedure Act 
As is the case with the CPEA and the ECT Act, the Criminal Procedure Act29 
(CPA) creates an exception for business records in terms of section 221 
under the heading admissibility of certain trade or business records.30 
If the conditions of section 221(1) are satisfied,31 any statement contained 
in a document that establishes a fact will be admissible on the mere 
production thereof.  
In terms of the conditions for admissibility the compilation of the document 
must have taken place in the ordinary course of business, and someone 
who can be reasonably presumed to have knowledge of the matters dealt 
with therein must supply it. Finally, the person who supplied the information 
must be dead, outside the Republic, or unable to testify due to mental or 
physical ailments.32  
Moreover, section 222 of the CPA incorporates sections 33-38 of the CPEA 
into all forms of criminal proceedings. In the present context, this means that 
the exception created by section 34 of the CPEA (for the admissibility of a 
data message where the author is not available) is also applicable to 
criminal proceedings.33 
Finally, sections 236 and 236A of the CPA create an exception for banking 
records (both local and international banks) where an employee of the bank 
certifies the accuracy of the record and confirms that the capture thereof 
took place in the ordinary course of business.34  
                                            
29  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA). 
30  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 773; Hofman 2006 SACJ 266; Schwikkard and 
Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 290-301; Zeffertt and Paizes South 
African Law of Evidence 418-441. 
31  The exception is dealt with in detail in traditional texts dealing with the law of 
evidence; Hofman 2006 SACJ 265.  
32  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 772-777; Hofman 2006 SACJ 266; Schwikkard 
and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 290-301; Zeffertt and Paizes South 
African Law of Evidence 418-441. 
33  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 772-777; Hofman 2006 SACJ 266; Schwikkard 
and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 290-301; Zeffertt and Paizes South 
African Law of Evidence 418-441. 
34  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 772-777; Hofman 2006 SACJ 266; Schwikkard 
and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 290-301; Zeffertt and Paizes South 
African Law of Evidence 418-441. 
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3.4 The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
Section 15(4)35 of the ECT Act creates a business records exception to the 
hearsay rule for any data message created in the ordinary course of 
business. The section, which is controversial,36 has been criticised because 
of the difficulties37 it creates. It reads as follows:  
(4) A data message made by a person in the ordinary course of business, or 
a copy or printout of or an extract from such data message certified to be 
correct by an officer in the service of such person, is on its mere production in 
any civil, criminal, administrative or disciplinary proceedings under any law, 
the rules of a self-regulatory organisation or any other law or the common law, 
admissible in evidence against any person and rebuttable proof of the facts 
contained in such record, copy, printout or extract. 
Hofman38 lists six difficulties with the section, and this commentary appears 
to have received the approval of other academic commentators.39 These 
difficulties appear to remain, and although the section has been at issue in 
several cases, it has often received superficial judicial treatment.40  
In LA Consortium41 Malan J held that:  
despite the very wide words of s 15(4), any hearsay contained in a data 
message must pass the criteria set out in s 3 of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
                                            
35  Duvenhage Evidential Analysis 9-34 for a thorough discussion of this exception. 
36  LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 12. 
37  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 771-772; Hofman 2006 SACJ 267; De Villiers 
2010 TSAR 734. 
38  Hofman 2006 SACJ 267-268, where the difficulties, summarised, are: 1. The 
exception is too wide; 2. The rebuttable presumption the section creates should not 
apply to all businesses; 3. The certificate required by an officer of the business 
imposes less responsibility than other similar exceptions; 4. The wording of the 
section is problematic; 5. The wide exception may force courts to consider excessive 
volumes of evidence; 6. When applied in criminal matters, the section arguably 
creates a reverse onus, which may not be constitutional.  
39  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 476; De Villiers 2010 TSAR 733-734; SALRC 
Discussion Paper 131 71-72; Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence 78-79, where 
the author evaluates the six grounds listed by Hofman, disagreeing specifically with 
one ground but endorsing the primary "reverse-onus" difficulty.  
40  For example, in S v Van der Linde 2016 3 All SA 898 (GJ), where the section was 
referred to, but only briefly; in Sublime Technologies (Pty) Ltd v Jonker 2010 2 SA 
522 (SCA), where although it appeared central to the dispute it was mentioned only 
in passing. 
41  LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 13. 
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In Absa Bank Ltd v Le Roux42 the court noted that: 
Section 15(4) has a twofold effect. It creates a statutory exception to the hearsay 
rule and it gives rise to a rebuttable presumption in favour of the correctness of 
electronic data falling within the definition of the term 'data message'.43  
Also, in the Supreme Court of Appeal, in Firstrand Bank Limited v 
Venter,44 in the context of section 15(4), the court noted that it: 
lays down the minimum requirements for admissibility…; and 
once produced was admissible against [a person] and [serves] as 'rebuttable 
proof' of the facts contained in the printouts… 
Earlier, in what appears to be the first case45 dealing with section 15(4), in 
Golden Fried Chicken (Proprietary) Limited v Yum Restaurants International 
(Proprietary) Limited,46 Du Plessis J held: 
In terms of section 15(4) of that Act a printout of a data message can constitute 
prima facie proof if the data message was made by a person in the ordinary 
course of business and if the printout is certified to be correct by ‘an officer in 
the service of such person’.47 
Further, in Ndlovu the court described section 15(4) as follows: 
Section 15(4) provides for two situations in which a data message may on its 
mere production be admissible in evidence. The first is 'a data message made 
by a person in the ordinary course of business', which, juxtaposed with the 
words that follow, clearly refers to an original data message, and is required 
to have been made 'in the ordinary course of business'. The second is a copy 
or printout of or an extract from such data message which is certified to be 
correct by an officer in the service of such person (being a person who made 
the data message in the ordinary course of business). Once either of these 
two situations is present, the data message is on its mere production 
admissible in evidence and rebuttable proof of the facts contained therein.48 
In Trend Finance (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for SARS49 the court pointed out 
that a party seeking to rely on section 15(4) must show that the document 
"sought to be admitted is a printout of information existing in electronic 
                                            
42  Absa Bank Ltd v Le Roux 2014 1 SA 475 (WCC). 
43  Absa Bank Ltd v Le Roux 2014 1 SA 475 (WCC) para 19. 
44  Firstrand Bank Limited v Venter 2012 JOL 29436 (SCA) para 16. 
45  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 772. 
46  Golden Fried Chicken (Proprietary) Limited v Yum Restaurants International 
(Proprietary) Limited 2005 ZAGPHC 311 (22 August 2005). Also see Duvenhage 
Evidential Analysis 12-13. 
47  Golden Fried Chicken (Proprietary) Limited v Yum Restaurants International 
(Proprietary) Limited 2005 ZAGPHC 311 (22 August 2005) 6.  
48  Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 172-173. 
49  Trend Finance (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
2005 4 All SA 657 (C) 678-679. 
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form." Consequently, it appears from this case that in order to rely on this 
statutory exception one must satisfy a court that the printout has a data 
message format somewhere on a computer or mechanical system. 
Moreover, in Director of Public Prosecution v Modise50 the court 
catergorised section 15(4)51 as follows: 
[It is] designed to … allow evidence in the form of the facts and opinions 
contained in a document which complies with [section 15(4)] to be admitted in 
evidence at a trial notwithstanding that the person who listed the facts and 
formed the opinions in the document is not called as a witness.52 
In an application to review the court above, in Modise, Lamont J 
seemed to indicate that notwithstanding some of the academic 
concerns pointed out above (which concerns were not dealt with – nor 
was any prior case law reviewed in reaching a decision), section 15(4) 
is an intentional step by South Africa's legislature to subjugate the 
hearsay rule:53 
[Section 15(4) is] specifically designed to enable [persons] to avoid the need 
to lead the evidence of a witness by way of producing him and then leading 
viva voce evidence. The facts and matters in a document are the evidence. 
The evidence is admissible if the provisions of this section are complied with. 
Nothing more is required. The section enables [persons] to easily produce 
evidence which will generally be of a formal and uncontested nature and to 
place same in documentary form before a court without the need to call the 
witness… [A person] does not have to send its experts to a variety of courts 
countrywide to give evidence which generally is uncontested with the 
concomitant waste of money and time. In addition the expert becomes free to 
perform other work. These sections allow limited resources to be properly and 
adequately used.54 
This wide exception appears to go further than previous statutory 
exceptions,55 and appears to favour evidence in the form of a data message 
if in a business context. This is probably contrary to the principle of 
functional equivalence. Moreover, as suggested by others,56 if a person in 
a business context is able to comply with the statutory provisions of section 
15(4), which simply require certification from an employee that the printout 
                                            
50  Director of Public Prosecution v Modise 2012 1 SACR 553 (GSJ). 
51  Duvenhage Evidential Analysis 34-38.  
52  Director of Public Prosecution v Modise 2012 1 SACR 553 (GSJ) 557. 
53  Duvenhage Evidential Analysis 34-38, where the author notes that s 15(4) of the 
ECT Act is an intentional departure from the Model Law, 1996; but concludes that 
the "radical" provision ought to be repealed in its entirety.  
54  Director of Public Prosecution v Modise 2012 1 SACR 553 (GSJ) 557. 
55  De Villiers 2010 TSAR 733-734; Hofman 2006 SACJ 267-268; Theophilopoulos 
2015 TSAR 476. 
56  Hofman 2006 SACJ 268; De Villiers 2010 TSAR 731; Fourie Using Social Media as 
Evidence 79; Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 476. 
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of a data message is correct, then those facts are rebuttably presumed true. 
Arguably, this creates a reverse onus that may be constitutionally suspect57 
in criminal cases, even though it is a presumption which can be challenged. 
Further, in a civil context, the fact that someone operates a business does 
not necessarily mean the data message is accurate, reliable or honest, even 
if certified.58 
However, as pointed out above in Modise, there is merit in the argument 
that the section is an intentional departure from the Model Law, 1996. 
Further, the cases analysed above indicate clearly that our courts will accept 
documentary hearsay when the conditions of section 15(4) of the ECT Act 
are satisfied.  
As suggested by the SA Law Reform Commission, the interplay between 
the statutory hearsay exceptions and section 15(4) of the ECT Act is 
"complex", creates "unnecessary confusion" and requires "greater 
alignment."59  
4 Selected international positions on hearsay electronic 
evidence  
What follows below in 4.1 to 4.4 is a consideration of the situation in several 
foreign jurisdictions where electronic evidence has had a longer time to 
develop and mature. The purpose of the examination of England, Canada 
and the United States is to facilitate suggestions for law reform. Ideally 
South Africa should seek to learn from other jurisdictions and/or avoid 
mistakes that may have already been made in the context of hearsay 
electronic evidence. This analysis is not intended to serve as a 
comprehensive comparative study of international law, but as a basis for 
gleaning information regarding possible interpretations in relation to 
hearsay electronic evidence.  
4.1 England and Wales 
The English law of evidence (on which the South African law of evidence is 
based) has been referred to as being founded on exclusionary rules, which 
contain two fundamental guiding principles – the best evidence rule and the 
                                            
57  Hofman 2006 SACJ 267. De Villiers 2010 TSAR 733-734; Hofman 2006 SACJ 267-
268; Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 476. 
58  De Villiers 2010 TSAR 733-734; Hofman 2006 SACJ 267-268; Theophilopoulos 
2015 TSAR 476. 
59  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 31-32, 70. 
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hearsay rule.60 Much as in South Africa, evidence will be admissible if 
relevant to an issue in dispute, subject to a number of exceptions.61 
Moreover, and again much as in South Africa, one of the core concerns 
insofar as computer evidence is concerned has been in relation to the 
hearsay rule.62 
In England,63 the position is the same as in South Africa – that is, if the 
production of data occurs without human intervention, it is real evidence (no 
hearsay enquiry).64 Conversely, if the data is a record of human assertions, 
then it is hearsay.65  
The key, as in many jurisdictions around the world, is to determine whether 
the credibility of the data relies on a person or a computer (via an automated 
process), and this distinction often leads to "confusion" and has acted as a 
"brake" on the introduction of new technology.66 
However, even if the data is documentary in nature and therefore subject to 
the exclusionary hearsay rules, there are several statutory exceptions, 
including those found in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Civil Evidence 
Act 1995.67 
In the fourth and most recent edition of Electronic Evidence,68 the authors 
of the chapter on hearsay appear critical of the "complex" rules one must 
consider. With this complexity in mind, it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to analyse the regulatory framework of hearsay evidence in England other 
than to note that an approach whereby data messages are classified as real 
evidence (if they rely on the credibility of a computer) is possible and 
appears to be preferred.69 
For example, in R (on the application of O) v Coventry Justices,70 automated 
transactions (involving a credit card and a pornography website) were 
                                            
60 Leroux 2004 IRLCT 202. 
61  Mason, Freedman and Patel "England and Wales" 347. 
62  Mason, Freedman and Patel "England and Wales" 363. 
63  For a comprehensive view of the English position, see Tapper Cross and Tapper on 
Evidence; also see Gallavin and Mason "Hearsay" 72-88.  
64  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 770. 
65  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 770.  
66  Reed "Admissibility and Authentication of Computer Evidence" 3-5. 
67  The exceptions are similar to those found in South Africa, including a business 
records exception. For a detailed analysis of the exceptions, see Tapper Cross and 
Tapper on Evidence 586-626. 
68  Tapper Cross and Tapper on Evidence 60-61; Gallavin and Mason "Hearsay" 72-88. 
69  Reed "Admissibility and Authentication of Computer Evidence" 2-6. 
70  R (on the application of O) v Coventry Justices [2004] All ER (D) 78. 
L SWALES PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  12 
regarded admissible real evidence on the basis that they were purely 
mechanically produced.  
Earlier, in R v Spiby,71 where an automated process (a computer) monitored 
telephone calls, this evidence was real evidence because there was no 
human intervention in the production of the data. Accordingly, it was not 
hearsay evidence.72 
Moreover, in McDonald v R,73 in a criminal appeal largely dealing with 
character evidence, the court found that a printout from a mobile phone 
service provider (Vodafone) was real evidence (rather than documentary 
hearsay). 
In R v Spiby74 the court expressed the following opinion when justifying why 
certain electronic evidence should be regarded as real evidence: 
Where information is recorded by mechanical means without the intervention 
of a human mind the record made by the machine is admissible in evidence 
provided, of course, it is accepted that the machine is reliable. 
In my view, the key point to take from the English position is that electronic 
evidence can be classified as either real evidence (not subject to the 
hearsay rules), or it can be classified as documentary evidence (subject to 
the hearsay rules). The classification of the evidence will depend on its 
nature. Simply, it appears from the cases reviewed above that if the data is 
subject to human intervention in its production, then it will be classified as 
hearsay documentary evidence. Conversely, if the data is not subject to any 
human intervention, then the evidence will be real evidence.  
4.2 Canada 
The Canadian law of evidence is predominantly based on English common 
law (except in Quebec),75 and as is the case in England and South Africa, 
                                            
71 R v Spiby [1990] 91 Cr App R 186. 
72  Castle v Cross [1985] 1 All ER 87, where a printout (from a computer or device) of 
what is displayed or recorded on a mechanical measuring device is real evidence. 
73  McDonald v R [2011] EWCA Crim 2933 para 42. 
74 R v Spiby [1990] 91 Cr App R 186, which quotes the article Smith 1983 Crim L R 
390. 
75  Boyd Canadian Law 87-105; also see CIA 2017 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html. 
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electronic evidence is subject to the same evidentiary regime as traditional 
evidence.76  
The electronic evidence must be material and relevant to the issues and 
must not be subject to any other exclusionary rule.77 The primary legislative 
instruments regulating electronic evidence are the Canada Evidence Act, 
1985 and the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act, 1999. Canada has departed 
from the Model Law, 1996 (and other jurisdictions)78 by using the term 
electronic record instead of data message or computer evidence. 
In R v Mondor79 the Ontario Court of Justice, referring to academic 
authors,80 confirms that electronic evidence can take the form of real 
evidence or documentary evidence. This is much like the position in South 
Africa and England. The court found that: 
Where the electronically stored data is recorded electronically by an 
automated process, then the evidence is real evidence. Where, however, the 
electronically stored information is created by humans, then the evidence is 
not real evidence, and is not admissible for its truth absent some other rule of 
admissibility. 
As with many other jurisdictions, Canada also has a business records 
hearsay exception, and the court in Mondor was tasked with determining 
whether hearsay electronic evidence (documentary evidence that is subject 
to human intervention) would be admissible in terms of the Canadian 
hearsay exception.81 
Using logic similar to that in the South African decisions in Ndlovu and Ndiki 
(discussed above), the Canadian court in Mondor found that: 
[The Canada Evidence Act] does not allow for the admission of hearsay 
evidence contained within an electronic document just because it is in 
electronic form. The applicant must first establish that the hearsay is 
admissible either under section 30 or some other mechanism. 
                                            
76  Groulx, Rothman and Zawidzki 2011 https://www.dentons.com/~/media/FMC%20 
Import/publications/pdf/a/Admissibility%20Understanding%20Types%20and%20So
urces%20of%20Electronic%20Evidence.ashx 22. 
77  For a comprehensive overview and discussion of the Canadian law of evidence, see 
Paciocco and Stuesser Law of Evidence. 
78  Seng and Chakravarthi 2003 https://www.agc.gov.sg/DATA/0/Docs/Publication 
Files/Sep_03_ComputerOutput.pdf 14. 
79  R v Mondor 2014 ONCJ 135 para 17. 
80  Underwood and Penner Electronic Evidence 186. 
81  Sections 30 and 31 of the Canada Evidence Act, 1985 
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Ultimately, after analysing previous cases dealing with hearsay electronic 
evidence82 the court found the evidence to be "inadmissible for the truth of 
their contents."83  
In Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc84 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court set 
out the position as follows (mimicking what in my view is the correct positon 
in South Africa): 
Electronic information may be considered either real or documentary 
evidence. If it is real evidence, it simply needs to be authenticated and the trier 
of fact will then draw their own inferences from it. Examples of real evidence 
include photographs and physical objects.85 
If electronic information is determined to be real evidence, the evidentiary 
rules relating to documents, such as the best evidence and hearsay rules, will 
not be applicable.86 
The court goes further to note that the real issue lies in deciding "when 
electronic information should be treated as real evidence, rather than 
documentary".87 Ultimately, electronic evidence will be real evidence when 
its production is "without human intervention."88  
The position in Canada - that data produced without human intervention is 
real evidence - has received judicial support, including in the matter of R v 
McCulloch,89 where telephone records were admitted as real evidence 
because of the automated nature of the data. 
Moreover, in R v Hall90 the court found that automated billing records were 
real evidence (although in this case they also fell under the hearsay 
business records exception). In this matter the Canadian court referred with 
approval to the English case of R v Spiby91 (discussed above), where the 
English court found that an automated process monitoring phone calls was 
real evidence (not subject to hearsay rules). 
                                            
82  R v Mondor 2014 ONCJ 135 paras 34-39, where previous Canadian cases dealing 
with hearsay electronic evidence are discussed. 
83  R v Mondor 2014 ONCJ 135 para 43. 
84  Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc 2012 NSSC 226. 
85  Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc 2012 NSSC 226 para 11. 
86  Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc 2012 NSSC 226 para 13. 
87  Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc 2012 NSSC 226 para 14. 
88  Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc 2012 NSSC 226 para 21. 
89  R v McCulloch [1992] BCJ 2282 para 18. 
90  R v Hall [1998] BCJ 2515. 
91  R v Spiby [1990] 91 Cr App R 186. 
L SWALES PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  15 
4.3 The United States of America  
It is almost impossible to concisely summarise the legal position on any legal 
issue in the United States, primarily because it is subject to a federal system. 
Each state has its own independent judiciary and applies its own procedural 
and evidentiary rules.92 
Be that as it may, the legal system of the United States is similar to that of 
South Africa and those jurisdictions discussed above in that it is a 
predominantly common law system based on English common law (at a 
federal level).93 Moreover, and as a general position, the United States 
adopts a similar stance in relation to hearsay electronic evidence. The 
United States adopts a business records hearsay exception,94 and 
distinguishes between computer-generated records (with no human 
intervention – real evidence), and computer-stored records (with human 
intervention – documentary hearsay).95 
In terms of the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is not admissible as 
evidence,96 but this is subject to several exceptions.97 The basis for 
considering the admissibility of electronic evidence in the United States is 
similar to that in South Africa – the evidence must be relevant, authentic, 
must not be hearsay, must be the best evidence available, and its probative 
value must outweigh any prejudicial effect.98 
In my view, the distinction between real and documentary evidence created 
in South Africa, England and Canada is largely the same as that observed 
in the United States, in that if the data relies on a human mind (or a human 
statement) it is subject to hearsay rules. If the data relies on, or its 
                                            
92  Schwerha, Bagby and Esler "United States of America" 798.  
93  Friedman and Hayden American Law 35-55; also see CIA 2017 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html. 
94  Schwerha, Bagby and Esler "United States of America" 797-835. 
95  Seng and Chakravarthi 2003 https://www.agc.gov.sg/DATA/0/Docs/Publication 
 Files/Sep_03_ComputerOutput.pdf. 
96  Federal Rules of Evidence, 1975 802. See also, Federal Rules of Evidence art VIII 
– Hearsay, and ss 801-807. 
97  Federal Rules of Evidence 803. See also, Federal Rules of Evidence art VIII – 
Hearsay, and ss 801-807. 
98  Kemp 2012 NC JOLT 20-21; Frieden and Murray 2011 Rich J L & Tech 2-6; 
Thomson 2012 https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/science_ 
technology/mobiledevices_new_challenges_admissibility_of_electronic_device.aut
hcheckdam.pdf; Pendleton 2013 http://mnbenchbar.com/2013/10/admissibility-of-
electronic-evidence/; Miskel 2015 http://www.emilymiskel.com/blog/admissibility-of-
digital-evidence-in-a-family-case/. 
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production is solely automated or mechanical, then it is not subject to the 
hearsay rules.99 
For example, in U-Haul Intern Inc. v Lumbermens,100 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt with computer-generated 
summaries of payments made on insurance claims, and found that, in the 
context of the business records hearsay exception: "Rule 803(6) provides 
that records of regularly conducted business activity meeting … criteria 
constitute an exception to the prohibition against hearsay evidence."101  
In Telewizja Polska USA Inc. v Echostar Satellite Corp102 the court found 
that images and text (that purported to show what a website looked like at 
a point in time) were not statements for purposes of the federal hearsay 
rules (akin to real evidence in South Africa). 
Moreover, in United States v Rollins103 the court found that computer-
generated evidence (without human intervention) was admissible without 
requiring admissibility in terms of hearsay rules.  
Furthermore, in Lorraine v Markel American Insurance Company104 the 
court delivered a comprehensive 101-page opinion outlining the 
admissibility of electronically stored information. One submission from a 
practitioner in the United States suggests that the court set the admissibility 
bar unnecessarily high,105 but the lengthy opinion canvasses all relevant 
United States' law (insofar as electronic evidence is concerned) and may 
well be a point of departure if US electronic evidence is at issue. 
In summary, the court comprehensively reviewed the applicable statutory 
regime for the admissibility of electronic evidence (at a federal level), and 
found that if evidence is generated by a computer, it cannot be subject to 
hearsay as it is not produced by a person.106 In the context of hearsay 
electronic evidence, the court found that:107 
When an electronically generated record is entirely the product of the 
functioning of a computerized system or process, such as the 'report' 
                                            
99  Joseph 1999 http://www.jha.com/us/articles/viewarticle.php?8. 
100  U-Haul Intern Inc. v Lumbermens 576 F 3d 1040 (9th Cir 2009). 
101  U-Haul Intern Inc. v Lumbermens 576 F 3d 1040 (9th Cir 2009) 1043. 
102  Telewizja Polska USA Inc v Echostar Satellite Corp 2004 WL 2367740. 
103  United States v Rollins 2004 WL 26780. 
104  Lorraine v Markel American Insurance Company 241 FRD 534. 
105  Esler 2007 DEESLR 80-82.  
106  Similar logic was used in the South African cases of Ex parte Rosch 1998 1 All SA 
319 (W) and Narlis v South African Bank of Athens 1976 2 SA 573 (A). 
107  Kemp 2012 NC JOLT 16-30. 
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generated when a fax is sent showing the number to which the fax was sent 
and the time it was received, there is no 'person' involved in the creation of 
the record, and no 'assertion' being made. For that reason, the record is not a 
statement and cannot be hearsay. 
In a similar vein, in United States v Lizarraga-Tirado108 the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that machine-generated evidence (without any 
substantial human intervention) is not hearsay. In this case the court found 
that a "pin" from Google Earth (satellite image software) was not an 
assertion by a person and was therefore not hearsay. The court stated as 
follows: "we join other circuits that have held that machine statements aren't 
hearsay".109 
Consequently, the key issue in the United States in relation to computer 
generated evidence and hearsay is to determine whether the evidence is 
subject to input, assertions or conclusions by a person. If so, it is hearsay. 
If not, and the evidence is automatically generated, then subject to the other 
evidential conditions being satisfied (relevance, authenticity, best evidence 
and the probative value outweighing prejudicial effect), the evidence will be 
admissible. Of course, as in South Africa and other jurisdictions, even if the 
evidence is hearsay in nature, then it may still be admissible under one of 
the statutory exceptions (contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence or in 
an applicable State statute).  
4.4 Comment 
Many jurisdictions appear to favour electronic evidence being admissible 
without hearsay considerations if it is produced by a machine or a computer 
without human intervention.  
Granted, there will always be a person involved in the genesis of machine- 
or computer-based evidence – whether to design, implement, maintain or 
repair - but this type of evidence is categorised by a system that does not 
rely on regular human input, and does not make any human assertions or 
observations. It can operate on an automated basis. For example, phone 
records or GPS data from Google Earth – there is a limited amount of human 
                                            
108  United States v Lizarraga-Tirado 2015 WL 3772772 (9th Cir 2015). 
109  United States v Lizarraga-Tirado 2015 WL 3772772 (9th Cir 2015) 7-8. The appeal 
court quotes the following cases in support of this conclusion: United States v 
Lamons 532 F 3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir 2008); United States v Moon 512 F 3d 359, 
362 (7th Cir 2008); United States v Washington 498 F 3d 225, 230 (4th Cir 2007); 
United States v Hamilton 413 F 3d 1138, 1142 (10th Cir 2005); United States v 
Khorozian 333 F 3d 498, 506 (3d Cir 2003). 
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involvement in their generation, and the credibility of the data as evidence 
derives predominantly from the system’s being automated.  
Consequently, in my view an accurate formulation of a rule applicable to 
such computer records would be the following: a data message will be real 
evidence (and not subject to hearsay considerations) where its credibility 
relies substantially (or predominantly) on a computer (or mechanical 
process).110  
Similarly, if a litigant relies on the truth of a statement with human 
intervention or input, or a human observation or summary is contained 
therein, then that evidence will be regarded as hearsay and inadmissible, 
unless it falls into one of the hearsay admissibility exceptions, such as 
business records. 
5 Suggestions for reform 
In comments to the Law Reform Commission's Discussion Paper 131,111 
the view from the legal profession and academia is mixed. What follows 
below is a synopsis of the findings of the SALRC, including published 
comments from the legal profession and academia, in relation to the issues 
dealt with in this contribution (relevant to hearsay electronic evidence), 
together with a discussion thereon, and suggestions for law reform. 
5.1 The definition of "data message" 
The third issue covered in the SALRC's Discussion Paper 131 deals with 
the definition of data messages. The Paper asks if the definition of "data 
message" in the ECT Act should be revised.112 
Ultimately, the SALRC concludes by noting that the current definition of data 
message (contained in the ECT Act) is problematic in that it strays from the 
Model Law by including the words "voice, where the voice is used in an 
automated transaction."  
Moreover, some have cautioned against moving away from internationally 
accepted terminology,113 and both the National Prosecuting Authority114 and 
Legal Aid South Africa have expressed the view that the current definition 
                                            
110  See, for example: S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck); Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional 
Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W). 
111  SALRC Discussion Paper 131. 
112  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 27-32. 
113  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 53. 
114  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 53. 
L SWALES PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  19 
of data message can be "confusing."115 As discussed in part one of this 
article, my view is that the definition should be amended.116 
5.2 Admissibility of data messages as evidence in legal 
proceedings in the context of hearsay  
In the light of the principle of functional equivalence,117 it cannot be that 
section 15 of the ECT Act automatically prescribes that all data messages 
are admissible. As a result, South African courts have consistently found 
that the ECT Act does not override the normal rules applicable to hearsay.118  
The obiter dictum in Ndiki (that all data messages should be treated as 
documentary hearsay),119 which position is supported by the Law Society of 
South Africa,120 should be avoided. As seen above, it would conflict with the 
internationally accepted position, and arguably it would not be conceptually 
correct.121 Moreover the fact that drawing the distinction between real 
evidence and documentary evidence in the context of data messages can 
be difficult should not result in sacrificing conceptual clarity. If a court is 
unsure whether evidence is real or documentary, it can err on the side of 
caution and classify the evidence as documentary hearsay. This would 
mean subjecting the data message to a hearsay enquiry, where in terms of 
the Law of Evidence Amendment Act the court would in any event have the 
discretion to admit the evidence - if the interests of justice demand that that 
be done. 
                                            
115  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 53-54. 
116  Swales 2018 PELJ 3-5. 
117  Swales 2081 PELJ 9. 
118  S v Brown 2015 ZAWCHC 128 (17 August 2015) para 18; Ndlovu v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W) 172-173, S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 
(Ck) para 31, La Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service 
Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v La Consortium & Vending 
CC t/a La Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ) para 13; Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 
474-475; Watney 2009 JILT 8-9; Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 776-777.  
119  S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck) para 33. The court relies on the opinion of Bilchitz 
"Law of Evidence" 796 to form the view that all data messages should be treated as 
hearsay. Although the argument of Bilchitz is noted (that all computer-based 
evidence relies on some human intervention or input), it is in my view semantics and 
outdated in 2018. As with the position in several foreign jurisdictions, including 
England, Canada and the United States of America, if a data messages relies 
substantially on a computer for its "credibility", then that evidence must be treated 
as real in nature. A court will always have the discretion to give the evidence very 
low weight if there are doubts about its accuracy and/or reliability. 
120  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 63. 
121  Hofman and De Jager "South Africa" 777 and particularly fn 3 thereof; 
Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 474. 
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Where the evidence is clearly automated and depends upon the credibility 
of a computer (or as Theophilopoulos puts it: an information system 
automatically generated data message which does not require the input of 
a human mind) then it must be treated as real evidence and cannot be 
subject to a hearsay enquiry.122 
As with other issues in the SALRC paper, there is no common ground 
among the comments received,123 and there is support for data messages 
to be admissible if relevant and authentic (regardless of hearsay),124 as well 
as support from both the South African Police Services and the Law Society 
of South Africa for the position that all data messages constitute hearsay.125  
The SALRC supports the view that hearsay evidence in a data message 
should be treated the same as a paper-based document (in line with the 
principle of functional equivalence).126 Ultimately, however, the SALRC 
proposes a Law of Evidence Amendment Bill127 to clarify the distinction 
between various types of electronic evidence (real or documentary), and to 
clarify the interaction between the statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
If the proposed amendment bill is supported, this will mean that the issue of 
whether a data message can constitute hearsay in the context of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act is absolutely resolved (with the answer being: 
data messages can contain hearsay). However, the rejection of the 
amendment bill (or if its promulgation takes place in a limited or partial form) 
will mean that technically there is still some doubt as to whether or not a 
data message can constitute hearsay (even though the cases discussed 
above appear to have all but removed any doubt). 
Consequently, if there is no amendment bill as suggested in Annexure A to 
the SALRC Discussion Paper 131, for the sake of clarity and best practice, 
there must be an amendment to the Law of Evidence Amendment Act with 
reference to data messages. Moreover, in the absence of drastic law reform, 
the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act and the Criminal Procedure Act should 
similarly be amended to take account of (and specifically refer to where 
                                            
122  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 474. 
123  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 62-64. 
124  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 63. 
125  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 63. 
126  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 67. 
127  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 67, 89-95. 
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necessary) data messages, and to ensure that there is consistency in the 
definition of a document.128  
Finally, in the context of limited law reform, the ECT Act also requires 
amendment in order to align it with the statutory exceptions to the hearsay 
rule. 
5.3 Distinguishing between various types of electronic evidence 
The determination as to whether a data message is real evidence or 
documentary evidence will dictate the admissibility requirements 
applicable;129 and importantly for the present purposes will determine 
whether a hearsay enquiry is necessary. (By its nature, real evidence is 
what it purports to be and it cannot be subject to the exclusionary hearsay 
rules.) 
The SALRC supports a distinction between automated data messages and 
data messages made by a person.130 In an article written after the 
publication of the SALRC report, even though not done so expressly, 
Theophilopoulos appears to agree by stating: 
a distinction should be made between 'an information system automatically 
generated data message which does not require the input of a human mind' – 
a real data message; and 'an information system produced and stored data 
message based on the input of a human mind' – a hearsay data message.131 
Moreover, recent cases in the form of Ndlovu, Ndiki and LA Consortium, 
amongst others, all endorse this approach. As seen above, this approach is 
also consistent with foreign law.132 
Some academics133 draw this distinction with reference to copyright 
cases134 by referring to "computer-assisted" and "computer-generated" 
data.135 The choice of the terms the legislature, SALRC or the SCA (as the 
case may be) decide to use to resolve this debate is probably secondary. 
                                            
128  See Annexure C of SALRC Discussion Paper 131, where there are extracts from 
legislation that will require amendment if the proposed amendment bill is not 
enacted.  
129  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 34-37. 
130  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 70. 
131  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 474; Hofman 2006 SACJ 257, 269. 
132  Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 474; SALRC Discussion Paper 131 70, where the 
SALRC confirm that the international position supports this distinction. 
133  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 445. 
134  Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA). 
135  Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) 
para 31. 
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The key principle is the endorsement of a distinction between types of 
electronically produced machine or computer evidence. 
In the proposed evidence amendment bill (Annexure A to the SALRC 
Discussion Paper 131), section 5 reads as follows: 
5. Evidence produced by processes, machines and other devices 
5.1 Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other law, evidence that is 
produced wholly or partly by a machine, device, or technical process – 
(i) is admissible in all legal proceedings; and 
(ii) may be produced as an electronic document. 
5.2 A statement which has been generated wholly by a machine, device or 
technical process does not constitute hearsay evidence. 
5.3 Subject to the provisions of this Act or unless the Court orders 
otherwise, the admissibility of evidence produced in terms of this section 
should be established by the oral testimony of a witness or witnesses. 
An electronic document (in section 5(1)(ii)) is defined as follows: 
'Electronic document' means data that are recorded or stored on any medium 
in or by a computer system or other similar device, and includes a display, 
printout or other output of that data… 
There is no definition of the term data message, nor is there a definition of 
data in this proposed amendment. The likelihood is that there will be a 
reliance on the definitions in the ECT Act and/or the Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill (when it becomes law). Moreover, the definition of 
hearsay is the same as that contained in the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act. 
In the context of the proposed section 5 of the amendment bill, the key 
question, in my view, is: When will a data message be wholly generated by 
a machine, device or technical process? 136 
As discussed in part one of this article,137 the core concern raised by some 
is that all computer-generated evidence has human involvement at some 
stage, and a court might take a literal approach and exclude evidence on 
the basis that there has been some human involvement in the maintenance 
or storing of the data. 
                                            
136 In terms of the proposed s 5(2), a statement generated wholly by a machine will not 
be hearsay. 
137 Swales 2018 PELJ 8-23. 
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Consequently, I would suggest replacing the word "wholly" with 
"substantially". As with the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, this may at 
first create room for some legal gymnastics, but a court will be seized with 
determining whether the data or output is substantially automated, or relies 
substantially on the credibility of a machine (such as phone records or GPS 
data). This minor amendment would also satisfy conceptual criticisms138 
that at some stage a human being is always involved in machine-generated 
evidence (or that in reality all computer based evidence relies on the credibly 
of a human being – the person who designs, implements, controls, 
maintains, etcetera).  
The other question, which may be semantics, is: In terms of section 5(2) of 
the proposed bill, under what circumstances will a print-out from a computer 
or technical device be regarded as a statement? It may be that the SALRC 
intended to include any output from a computer (all forms of electronic 
evidence) and refer to it as a statement. However, the word statement could 
be misconstrued (or a situation could develop where an output may not be 
a statement). Consequently, I would suggest that the word statement be 
replaced with "any output", or "data" to avoid any confusion. 
Consequently, it appears that in order to foster clarity and certainty, law 
reform is required. The most effective (and cleanest) approach appears to 
be the promulgation of legislation along the lines set out in Annexure A to 
the SALRC Discussion Paper 131. That said, this approach would also be 
the most drastic and require the most change in our current legal framework. 
Conversely, if there is no support for the amendment bill, or if it does not 
deal with the distinction between real and documentary electronic evidence, 
then as suggested by the South African Police Services139 the ECT Act 
should be amended (section 15 thereof). The amendment should make a 
clear distinction between mechanically produced evidence without any 
substantial human intervention (real evidence), and mechanically produced 
evidence with substantial human intervention (documentary hearsay). Put 
differently,140 and using copyright terminology, a distinction should be drawn 
between "computer-assisted" and "computer-generated" output.  
                                            
138  Bilchitz "Law of Evidence" 796; Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 
432-433; SALRC Discussion Paper 131 68-69. 
139  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 69. 
140  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4th ed 445, referring to Haupt 
t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 
31. 
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5.4 Statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule 
"Confusing" and "complicated" – two common descriptions of the statutory 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.141 Why is this the case? Potentially, a legal 
practitioner must consider multiple sources of law,142 and a variety of (at 
times) conflicting and conceptually grey cases when determining whether a 
hearsay exception applies. This is less than ideal and leads to 
misunderstanding and inconsistent application. 
In addition, the business-records exception created by section 15(4) of the 
ECT Act has received severe academic criticism.143 Moreover, in comments 
received by the SALRC, the South African Police Services and Legal Aid 
submit that in the context of criminal proceedings the section unjustly shifts 
the onus of proof and may well be unconstitutional.144 Conversely, the 
National Prosecution Authority and the Law Society of South Africa feel it 
should remain unchanged, but perhaps be given a restrictive interpretation. 
Be that as it may, if the amendment bill proposed by the SALRC is 
promulgated in its current form it will seek to repeal section 3 of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act; section 15(4) of the ECT Act; section 27-38 of 
the CPEA, and sections 221, 222 and 236 of the CPA.  
It will replace these with a singular piece of legislation which facilitates a 
more coherent, less fragmented approach.145 The primary sections relevant 
in the current context will be section 3 (the general hearsay provision – 
similar to section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act), and section 4 
(the business records exception). The SALRC have not tried to reinvent the 
wheel, and the legislation is familiar and internationally consistent. The 
primary purpose of the law reform would be to promote certainty and remove 
the current confusion (which appears to be caused by the fragmentation of 
the relevant legislation in use at the moment).  
Chapter 5 of the most recent SALRC report146 proposes three options for 
law reform in the context of electronic evidence. These are: (option 1) the 
retention of the status quo with the minor statutory reform of the existing 
                                            
141  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 31. 
142  The Law of Evidence Amendment Act, the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act, the 
Criminal Procedure Act and the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act. 
143  See the discussion in para 3.4 above. 
144  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 76. 
145  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 87-88, where the SALRC states that the proposed bill 
is reflective of practice in several commonwealth countries and consistent with the 
Model Law, 1996. 
146  SALRC Discussion Paper 131 83-88. 
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legislation; (option 2) the retention of the existing regulatory framework with 
the introduction of additional legislation to supplement it; and (option 3) the 
reform of the current regulatory framework with the repeal of existing laws 
and the introduction of a single piece of legislation. The SALRC provisionally 
recommends option 3, with the introduction of new legislation (Annexure A 
to the SALRC Discussion Paper 131). This option would amount to a 
comprehensive overhaul of the current legal framework. 
Given the analysis above, in my view the approach recommended by the 
SALRC should be endorsed. In addition to resolving the more serious issues 
relating to admissibility and the weight of electronic evidence, it would also 
clarify the current inconsistency in some definitions in civil and criminal 
proceedings. 
6 Conclusion 
While electronic evidence is certainly susceptible147 to manipulation and 
evolving technology, its use is now commonplace and ubiquitous. A plethora 
of expertise is readily available to detect and comment on manipulation 
where that may be at issue, and the law must adapt.148 South Africa cannot 
sustain a legal position where the exclusion of evidence is justified because 
it is new and/or uncertain. The traditional principles of evidence need not be 
re-written, but in certain instances some adaption is required. 
South African courts and academics have been almost entirely ad idem in 
their determination that electronic evidence can constitute hearsay within 
the meaning of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act. Notwithstanding the 
imminent promulgation of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, the 
evidentiary position will remain unchanged by that legislation.149 
The categorisation of a data message as either real evidence or 
documentary evidence will play a pivotal role in determining the admissibility 
requirements the evidence must face. With this in mind, most recent South 
African cases dealing with the admissibility of electronic evidence appear to 
accept that a distinction must be drawn between evidence generated by a 
                                            
147  SALRC Issue Paper 27 7-13, where apparent difficulties with electronic evidence are 
discussed in detail. 
148  CMC Woodworking Machinery (Pty) Ltd v Pieter Odendaal Kitchens 2012 5 SA 604 
(KZD) para 2, where it is stated in the context of technological change that "it is 
therefore not unreasonable to expect the law to recognise such changes and 
accommodate it"; Heroldt v Wills 2013 2 SA 530 (GSJ) para 8; Hofman and De Jager 
"South Africa" 761; Theophilopoulos 2015 TSAR 461.  
149  Based on the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill B6-2017. 
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computer without substantial human involvement (real evidence and no 
hearsay enquiry) and evidence where there is human involvement or 
assertions (documentary hearsay and subject to the exclusionary hearsay 
rules). However, the distinction is not always clearly articulated and/or 
justified, and the statutory exception created in section 15(4) of the ECT Act 
remains contentious for many academics. 
That notwithstanding, it appears to be settled foreign law that electronic 
evidence that relies on a computer or automated system (such as phone 
records) should be introduced into evidence without the need for a hearsay 
enquiry (of course, subject to any other exclusionary rule of evidence 
applicable in that jurisdiction, such as relevance, authenticity or the best 
evidence rule). 
The current position in South Africa, with a multitude of sources of law, 
differing definitions, some conflicting case law, some questionable obiter 
statements and, importantly, no real clarity on the distinction between 
different types of electronic evidence, would benefit greatly from law reform, 
whether minor reform to existing statutes or a more aggressive overhaul of 
the legislative framework as proposed by Annexure A to the SALRC's 
Discussion Paper 131. 
Finally, and based on the analysis contained in this two-part article, there 
must be law reform in at least the following areas: the definition of data 
messages; the definition of the term document in the statutes applicable to 
the hearsay exceptions; a distinction between types of electronic evidence 
insofar as computer-generated evidence with human intervention and 
without human intervention is concerned; and more cohesion and alignment 
with the statutory hearsay exceptions.  
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